

**Abstract:** In this talk, I take issue with a claim put forward by William Fish (2009) according to which we see facts, understood as actual states of affairs. Call this claim 'factualism'. Fish contends that there would be *scientific* evidence that we see facts. My contention is that a closer examination of the scientific evidence does not support factualism. Firstly, I define what it means to *see* a fact. I define a state of seeing as a conscious visual presentational mental state. States of seeing manifest visual properties and objects. The nature of visual objects, however, is disputed in vision science. Researchers debate whether visual objects are to be understood as bundles of properties or as attribute-substances manifolds. Factualism is an instance of the latter. Facts are either particulars having properties (a's being F) or two particulars having some relation (a's having-R to b). I will focus on the former kinds of facts. Fish maintains that the recent debate on the nature of sensory individuals, and in particular experiments on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration lend support to factualism. After examining both experiments, I will show that all perceptual psychology requires us to introduce within our ontological inventory are property-instances. This lends support to a bundle theory of visual objects, whilst leaving the issue open about the ontological status of objects in the environment. This conclusion is compatible with both naïve realism and intentionalism.